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Effectuating Public International Law through
Market Mechanisms?
by
ANNE VAN AAKEN∗

Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of
states: its addressees and its enforcers were states. That has changed recently.
Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been
extensively analyzed, their influence on its enforcement has been neglected,
although the idea of using private interests in order to foster social goals has a long
history. This article draws on theoretical insights of a rational-choice approach to
PIL in order to analyze the prerequisites of effectuating PIL through privatemarket-actor incentives and market mechanisms. (JEL: K 33, F 55, F 59)
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Introduction

Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of
states: both the addressees and the enforcers of PIL were states. The effectuation
of PIL therefore depended on states, and the state could be treated as a black box.
That has changed during the last decades. Ever more, PIL not only is addressing
(ultimately) private persons or entities, but also is enforced through cooperation
between states and nonstate actors (NSAs),1 be they enterprises or
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The idea of making use of private
interests in order to foster social goals has a long history and has been well
acknowledged since Adam Smith. Also, the idea of using private interests for the
effectuation of national law is also well known, certainly in private law,2 but also
in international human-rights law and international investment law. This
adjudicatory mechanism for the effectuation of law is used when private actors are
the protégées of PIL, and it works through private individuals using litigation to
effectuate their interests.
International legal scholarship, like national legal scholarship, has mainly
relied on litigation and coercive mechanisms for making law effective. Within the
∗

I would like to thank Stefan Voigt and Rekha Oleschak for helpful comments, and
also the participants in the Lübbenau Conference “Coordination in the Absence of
Sovereignty” for very helpful comments. Special thanks go to Christoph Engel, Richard
McAdams, and Peer Zumbansen.
1
In the definition of this term, international organizations are not included.
2
Early on, JHERING [1880].
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national realm, this is certainly justified – the coercive monopoly of the state as
well as judicial mechanisms and state-backed enforcement of the law render other
mechanisms of effectuating the law less important. In PIL, relying on coercive
mechanisms like adjudicatory mechanisms and enforcement judicial decisions is
much more problematic, first because not all issue areas of PIL have adjudicatory
mechanisms, and second because the system lacks a central enforcement
mechanism. Some commentators therefore even go as far as to deny the legal
character of international law, calling it rather a system for cloaking power plays
in legal terms. Other, more positivistic scholars just think of it as a de lege lata
imperfect legal system and put much emphasis on describing it as a
constitutionalized system in the making.3
But are there other mechanisms that could make international law effective? I
submit that international legal scholarship has largely overlooked private market
actors as enforcers as well as (self-enforcing) market mechanisms that might serve
that purpose under certain circumstances to be identified. At the same time, I
submit that, although NSAs and their role in effectuating international law have
been analyzed, primarily by focusing on NGOs and their monitoring functions,
private market actors have been neglected in the analysis – certainly as actors who
are able to contribute to the effectuation of PIL. It is by no means my intention to
deny the importance of national and international courts and tribunals and their
contribution to the effectiveness of PIL. Rather, I would like to describe additional
mechanisms that, in my view, have been neglected, thereby depriving PIL
scholarship of one additional potential institutional mechanism for institutional
design in the international sphere. In order to make my argument plausible, I will
draw on several examples, which all describe different constellations in
international law where market actors play a role for effectuating the regime.
Let me clarify what this paper is not: it is not a normative analysis and is not
proposing any optimal mix of enforcement of PIL. Rather, it seeks to highlight
certain mechanisms descriptively. It does not talk about the creation of market
mechanisms (e.g., tradable emission certificates as in international environmental
law), but seeks to highlight how existing markets are used for effectuating PIL. It
also does not talk about NGOs as actors relevant to the effectuation of PIL (in the
litigation or the enforcement stage), although their importance is by no means
denied. Rather, I would like to highlight some mechanisms at work in fields
hitherto not in the focus of research. This paper thus aims at making a contribution
to the problem of effectiveness4 of international law, focusing on the role of
private market actors and market mechanisms.
From an economic point of view, law matters to the extent that a marginal
increase in compliance is generated (GUZMAN [2008, p. 23]). I understand the
notion of effectuation broadly here: it includes all moments and modes in the
compliance game, including the gathering of information on (non)compliance of
3

PETERS [2006], FASSBENDER [1998], WALTER [2001], WET [2006], FROWEIN
[2000], BOGDANDY [2006].
4
Effectiveness and compliance are different notions. Whereas effectiveness looks for
a causal mechanism between the law and the behavior – that is, law affects state behavior
– compliance just looks at whether the behavior conforms to the norm.
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states, the way to litigation, the way judicial awards are enforced, and other
situations where no litigation is available and self-enforcing mechanisms are used
for effectuation.
The article is organized as follows. First, I will outline the underlying theory of
this approach. I therefore draw on rational-choice international relations theory as
well as an economic approach to international law (section 2). Then I will take up
several constellations in international law to illustrate the relevance of the market
mechanisms and market players for the effectuation of international law. By using
those examples, I wish to highlight the diversity of, and simultaneously identify,
common underlying prerequisites for the functioning of the market mechanism as
a means of effectuating PIL (section 3). The last section summarizes and
concludes (section 4).
2

A Theoretical Approach to the Market as Enforcement Mechanism of
International Law

Much research has been conducted on the question of why certain PIL rules (hard
or soft) come about, that is, PIL is used as explanandum.5 If law is taken as the
dependent variable, many explanatory factors for the making of PIL can be taken
into account. If, e.g., one wants to explain why there is harmonization of capital
market regulatory standards, then the relative importance of market incentives,
political pressure on the national plane, and multilateral institutions can be
analyzed.6 The influence of NSAs – be they NGOs or private market actors – on
the making of PIL, including soft law, in a two-level game played by governments
in international negotiations7 (e.g., in trade or environmental law) is by now well
established. Furthermore, the creation of private governance structures and joint
initiatives on transnational rules, often initiated by NGOs together with business,
sometimes also with the involvement of states, has been analyzed.8 Thereby, the
first stage of the international-law game is analyzed.
My focus is different: I would like to take the effectiveness of PIL as
explanandum, that is, I analyze the second stage of the game, when compliance
decisions have to be made. Here, I wish to highlight a neglected variable in
effectuating PIL: market forces and private market actors’ incentives9 and their
interplay with states in effectuating PIL. The black-box state is thus opened also
in the compliance stage of the game. I am not submitting this approach as a

5

See GOLDSMITH AND POSNER [2005] and DOBBIN, SIMMONS, AND GARRETT [2007]
for the diffusion of national public policies.
6
See SIMMONS [2001] for capital market standardization; see more generally
GUZMAN [2008, pp. 119f.], ABBOTT et al. [2000], and ABBOTT AND SNIDAL [2000].
7
Seminally, PUTNAM [1988]. See also LEVIT [2007].
8
PATTBERG [2005] and references therein. See also Peer ZUMBANSEN [2009], who
highlights that many of the issues discussed are similar to those involved in private–
public partnerships, hybrid forms of governance, and the idea of markets as regulators in
the national sphere.
9
Note that I am explicitly focusing on private market actors and not NGOs.
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panacea, and it cannot be expected to work in all areas of PIL (e.g., security), but
it might work in many areas.
Two constellations can be distinguished: (1) private actors’ interests are the
object and purpose of the PIL norm; (2) private actors may be the ultimate
addressees of PIL, but the object and purpose of the regulation is not their interest
but a public good (e.g., trade, or fighting terrorism financing). In the first case,
private actors usually have a right and therefore have a direct incentive to take up
their own case, if PIL provides them with a legal possibility to do so, e.g., in
international human-rights law and investment law. In the second case, the object
and purpose of the treaties is not the protection of private market actors as such,
but their interests are affected. Since there is no public-interest litigation in PIL,10
there is no direct legal avenue for them to make their interest heard in
international adjudicatory mechanisms. But there are still two possibilities for
using private market actors for the effectuation of PIL. In the case that
international litigation for states is available, their role might be important in that
they have a strong incentive to generate information on noncompliance of third
states – information the governments usually do not have – and they may also
pressure their governments to take action on the international plane, thereby
having potential to mitigate the second-order enforcement problem in PIL in the
litigation stage. Furthermore, there are regulatory network externality
constellations in which PIL norms can make use of market mechanisms. Even if
the international norms are not economic in purpose, they might still rely on
market forces and private incentives if the markets are structured in a certain way.
By market mechanisms I mean that the price mechanism is directly involved in
the incentives generated for private actors through making market transactions
become more costly (or even prohibitively costly) if the norms are not adhered to.
After briefly discussing the effectuation of PIL if the state is considered a unitary
actor, I will turn to the two constellations alluded to above: litigation and market
mechanisms.
2.1 Explaining the Effectiveness of PIL through the Unitary Actor State
Most of the schools in international relations theory using rational-choice theory,
certainly the realist school as well as the institutionalist school,11 analyze state
behavior in compliance matters by assuming the state to be a unitary actor. Also,
scholars in international law and economics tend to view the state as a black box,
usually for methodological reasons (GUZMAN [2008, pp. 18f.], GOLDSMITH AND
POSNER [2005, pp. 3f.) – a view to which I subscribe in principle. Although the
liberal school, especially Moravcik (MORAVCSIK [1997]) and Slaughter
(SLAUGHTER [2004]), have undertaken to the state into its different components,
focusing on informal networks of government officials engaged in transnational
10

There are a few exceptions under some regional human-rights treaties that allow for
altruistic NGO litigation; see for details VAN AAKEN [2005].
11
It is impossible to draw a more differentiated picture of the different schools in
international-relations theory here. For an overview, see the articles in CARLSNAES,
RISSE, AND SIMMONS [2002].
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governance, the role of market actors and forces in compliance matters has not
received particular attention to date.
The focus of all schools is the explanation of how international law works (or
does not work) and under what circumstances. In trying to explain how PIL is
“able to affect state behavior despite a lack of coercive enforcement mechanism”
(GUZMAN [2008, p. 9]), the view is broadened from the classical sources of PIL
(treaties, custom, general principles12) to the inclusion of soft law, since all those
norms are deemed to operate through the same basic set of mechanisms (GUZMAN
[2008, p. 9]). This broad definition of PIL will be followed here.13
As a starting point for the theoretical discussion on effectiveness, the classical
state-as-a-black-box view is briefly described. This allows us to investigate later
in which constellations the role of private actors may be important. Depending on
the underlying game-theoretical structure, compliance and effectiveness are either
increased or decreased. In pure coordination games, no player has an incentive to
defect from a given PIL norm. Once a standard is set, states are better off
complying with the standard, e.g., in aviation security. It therefore should not
matter whether there is law or just a social norm creating a focal point on which to
coordinate. In mixed-motive games, e.g., a pure prisoners’ dilemma (PD), the
incentives to defect are far stronger. Each state has an incentive to defect, and
even in a repeated game, compliance is by no means assured. Many games in
between – especially the stag-hunt game, which is a trust game, as well as the
battle-of-the-sexes game, which is a game of distributional concerns – have been
analyzed by scholars in international law and economics. In pure coordination
games, in common-interest games, and in the battle-of-the-sexes game, special
arrangements for enforcing the law with sanctions are not necessary, as
cooperation is the best strategy. Social norms, creating a focal point, are therefore
sufficient.14 Cooperation is more difficult in a PD game, and frequent violations of
the law are to be expected. Those analyses are not repeated here in detail.15
Why do we see compliance with international law nevertheless? Guzman
develops a theory of compliance based on reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation,
with a focus on the last (GUZMAN [2008, pp. 9, 33f.]). Usually, direct and indirect
sanctions are distinguished. Direct sanctions are those that directly create costs for
the violating states, e.g., war, retorsions, or reprisals. Indirect sanctions work
through reputational mechanisms and deteriorate the violating state’s ability to
cooperate in the international sphere through its declining reputation for credible
commitment. Direct sanctions include reciprocal noncompliance and retaliation.
In the first case, the reciprocal action is not necessarily costly to the sanctioning
state (apart from forgone gains from future cooperation); rather it results from a
desire to maximize the payoff in the light of new circumstances. Defection of one
party can thus be expected to lead to noncooperation by the other party in the
12

See Art. 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).
Clearly, this is an external point of view on the law – a social-science perspective.
This allows for the inclusion of nonbinding soft law in the definition of PIL, although it is
not a source of law in the sense of Art. 38 ICJ Statute.
14
On the role of focal points in compliance, see MCADAMS AND NADLER [2008].
15
See GUZMAN [2008, pp. 33f.]; GOLDSMITH AND POSNER [2005].
13
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future. Noncompliance is thus only to be expected if a one-time defection yields
bigger payoffs than continued cooperation. Reciprocity, though, works only where
the benefits of an international agreement are excludable.
Retaliatory sanctions are costly to the sanctioning state and are intended to
punish the violating state. Those sanctions can be political, economic, or even
military. As is well known in PIL, sanctioning by retaliation thus leads to a
second-order enforcement problem, as every state would prefer to free-ride and
have other states bear the cost of retaliation (second-order PD). Thus, such
sanctions are not imposed very often. But that may turn out to be correct only if
one does not take into account the private actors involved, that is, if one does not
play also a two-level game in enforcement.
Reputation is viewed by many rational-choice scholars (next to reciprocity
(PARISI AND GHEI [2003]) and retaliation) as one of the main driving forces for
compliance of states with PIL.16 If the assumption is correct that a state’s
reputation for poor compliance inhibits other states from cooperating with that
state, noncompliance generates reputation costs as indirect sanctions for the
future. This may change the payoff in a given game in a way that generates
compliance.17 Nonreputational payoffs as well as reputational payoffs thus have to
be taken into account in a theory of compliance. Reputational sanctions, though,
can only work if there is information available on whether a state has complied or
not. This is often difficult to obtain. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about the
payoffs (by the violating state as well as all the other states); uncertainty about
legal rules, especially if they are ambiguous or incomplete; and uncertainty about
actions. International courts and tribunals have, i.a., the function of reducing those
kinds of uncertainty – they have a fact-finding as well as a law-finding function.
Court decisions are thus one way of making the reputational sanctions effective.
Others are of course available, such as treaty-internal monitoring mechanisms,
especially if outcomes are made transparent to other states and/or the public. Also
in those constellations, private actors might be important in order to initiate
litigation.
2.2 Explaining Effectiveness through Private Market Actors’ Incentives
How can private market actors contribute to the compliance of states, and in
particular to the reputational mechanism? And are there further mechanisms to
generate compliance? In my view, yes, once we open the black-box state and look
at private actors incentives in litigation and market mechanisms as two possible
constellations. That leads me to the point I would like to make in this paper: A
theory of compliance with PIL should not be confined to state behavior only.
Rather it should be complemented by the role of private market actors in
effectuating PIL. Those constellations come in two forms: In the first, litigation is
involved, and private market actors’ incentives to litigate are used to effectuate
international law. This form has been often analyzed in the areas of trade,
16

GUZMAN [2002], [2008], DOWNS AND JONES [2002]. Differently, GOLDSMITH AND
POSNER [2005] attribute little behavioral force to reputation.
17
Extensively in GUZMAN [2008, pp. 34–41] as well as GUZMAN [2002].
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investment, and human rights.18 In the second form, there are no adjudicatory
mechanisms and thus no litigation, but PIL is designed so that it is in the interest
of market actors to adhere to the law. Here, states alone would not be able to
effectuate PIL, nor would private parties; but their interplay might lead to
compliance with PIL. Both of these forms will be analyzed below.
2.2.1

Enhancing Effectiveness through Litigation

In many constellations, PIL’s ultimate addressees are private persons and market
actors. They may influence the effectuation of PIL in three ways: private litigation
on the international level based on PIL, private litigation on the national level
based on PIL, and fostering international litigation in state-to-state disputes. The
last way will be illuminated in Section 3 of this article by an example; the first
two ways are self-evident and have been extensively analyzed.
In the first way, private actors have a direct interest in making the states adhere
to the law, because their interests are directly protected by the PIL norm.
Sometimes, there is also a direct course of action for individuals or businesses to
hold their own state or third states accountable under PIL through international
adjudicatory mechanisms. If what the international norm protects is not a direct
interest of a state but rather rights of private persons, litigation by states is less
likely to be used if only state-to-state litigation is available. Governments act as a
“political filter” (SYKES [2005, pp. 647f.]). A state would weigh all other interests
(e.g., foreign policy concerns) against the interest of taking up a case against
another state before international tribunals; in contrast, if private persons have the
legal possibility to bring claims, no such considerations interfere. Evidently, if an
actor is not directly affected by a state measure, the incentive to bring a complaint
is not high; the same applies to states, e.g., for inter omnes norms (second-order
PD). All human-rights treaties allow for interstate complaints, and in all such
treaties interstate complaints are greatly underutilized in comparison with private
actions.19 Thus, Scott and Stephan consider the ability of private persons to
initiate proceedings directly as one hallmark of the “formal enforcement” of
PIL,20 since directly affected persons are much more likely to take up their own
case. International investment law, human-rights law, and European Union law
are the foremost examples where private actors have an interest of making their
own (or third) states comply with the law and are given a private right of action.
This holds true especially if the costs for using the system are minimized. Equally,
European Union law can be said to be effectuated not only through the direct
effect (which leads to an enforcement of EU law on the national plane), but also in
that private actors have, under certain circumstances, direct or indirect access to
the European Court of Justice.21 Here, private (market) actors have a double
function: they generate information on noncompliance of states, and they initiate
18

For trade law, see SYKES [2005]; for human rights, see VAN AAKEN [2005]. For
investment law the mechanism is obviously private enforcement; see for an overview
DOLZER AND SCHREUER [2008].
19
For details see VAN AAKEN [2005].
20
SCOTT AND STEPHAN [2006]; also GUZMAN [2008, p. 50].
21
See the articles in BAUDENBACHER AND BUSEK (eds.) [2008].
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litigation, thus circumventing the gatekeeping function of diplomatic protection.
Nevertheless, the possibility of direct action by private actors solves only the first
step in the enforcement stage of the game. International judicial decisions are not
necessarily complied with – the second-order enforcement problem still arises in
the postlitigation compliance phase.
There is an issue area, though, where this problem is also mitigated through
market forces: international investment law. Here, private actions against foreign
states are very forceful, especially because there is usually no exhaustion-of-localremedies requirement. Thus the first stage of enforcement, bringing a complaint,
directly relies on the incentive of a private market actor. Furthermore, also the
second stage of enforcement, compliance with an international award, is fostered
through private market actors. The decisions of the international tribunals on the
payment of damages can be enforced in any other member state of the ICSID
Convention22 and are thus readily utilizable. Here, there is no second-order
enforcement problem, as the private party is given, by means of decisions that are
res judicata, an enforcement possibility in any other state, using the central
enforcement mechanisms of national legal orders. If the ICSID is the venue
chosen, then the case is well publicized, thus enhancing the force of reputational
costs for states, as such disputes lead presumably to less foreign direct investment,
since investors shun states with too high political risks. The market for capital
may thus enhance compliance. One should note that the reputational factor does
not relate to the future cooperation with other states, but to the future cooperation
of private actors.
In the second form, private actors use national litigation to effectuate PIL.
International legal scholars, as well as some international-relations scholars, rely
to a large extent on the implementation of PIL in the national legal orders and thus
the enforcement of PIL through national courts, which are deemed also to
internalize PIL.23 The added value of this view is that it captures legal
mechanisms of national commitment to international norms. It also illuminates the
different ways in which PIL can be effectuated. The Human Rights Act of Great
Britain of 1998, e.g., makes a difference for that country’s adherence to the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), in that British citizens may now
allege a violation of the ECHR directly in British courts. The direct effect of
European Community Law in the national legal orders of member states is another
prominent example. This kind of effectuation relies on the central enforcement
mechanisms for national legal orders, once a decision is issued. But with very few
exceptions, there is no direct effect of PIL in the national legal orders. For
scholars in international law and economics, the interplay with national courts has
not been at the forefront of discussion, in contrast with international-law scholars,
22

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), Washington, DC, 18 March 1965, in force
14 October 1966, 575 United Nations Treaty Series 159.
23
KOH [1997b], [1997a], SLOSS AND JINKS (eds.) [2009]. Here, also tort litigation by
private actors against private actors is relevant, as in connection with the United States
Alien Tort Claim Act, whereby private individuals may sue other individuals or entities
on the basis of Customary International Law.
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who stress that mechanism. Since this form relies on the central enforcement
mechanism of nation-states, it will not be discussed further here.
In the third form, private market actors’ interests are protected only indirectly.
The more obvious role of private actors in those issue areas of PIL where they
have a direct complaint mechanism at their disposal should not make us overlook
the less obvious one: the role of private parties does not stop with the possibility
of having direct access to international courts. Rather, they can also play a role in
enforcing PIL when given domestic possibilities to force their states to take a case
to the international plane. The inertia of the potential sanctioning state can be
overcome through the impetus and push of private market actors who have an
interest in the effectiveness of PIL, e.g., by lobbying their governments.24 This
recourse is even stronger if states have committed themselves to listen to private
actors by creating legal venues for them to make their government act. Legal
procedures of this kind, especially if the decision of the government to take an
action (or not) against another state is subject to judicial review, considerably cut
the discretion of governments and thus mitigate the second-order enforcement
problem. Once a case reaches the international realm (e.g., courts and tribunals),
noncompliance will be readily observable and monitored, and reputational costs
thus enhanced. Information is thus generated for other states to learn about
noncompliance of other states. This can have an impact on the reputation of the
violating state and thus change the payoff for violations. In the case of European
Union law, there is another effective watchdog, namely the European
Commission, which can take violating states to the European Court of Justice.
This is, though, rather exceptional in PIL.
2.2.2 Effectuation of International Law through Market Mechanisms
A further, and in my view much less researched, area is the constellation where
law is constructed in such a way that it is in the self-interest of rational market
actors to adhere to international law: PIL can here be effectuated through market
mechanisms. In many issue areas of PIL, there is no international adjudicatory
mechanism and the ultimate addressees (although not the protégées) of the law are
private actors. If the incentives for the private actors are such that they comply
with the law, the law can become effective through being self-enforcing, if certain
prerequisites are met. Here, the focus is not mainly on the governments’ role in
compliance with PIL, but rather on governance. If it is true that in ever more areas
of PIL “we observe complex blends of private and public governance” (ABBOTT
25
AND SNIDAL [2001, p. 346]), it makes sense to include in the analysis the role
and incentives of private actors, especially the use of market mechanisms.
A good starting point for understanding in which constellations market
mechanisms may work is the question of externalities. Externalities occur if one
24

Of course, also NGOs may lobby their governments, but usually they have no legal
venue to do so. Furthermore, they are not the focus of this paper.
25
ABBOTT AND SNIDAL [2001, p. 346]. Whereas they ask why governance
arrangements are likely to emerge, I leave out the question of international law or
standards as explanandum and focus instead on compliance, that is, under what
conditions given governance arrangements are effective.
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actor’s conduct affects the well-being of another without the other’s agreement, or
if the externality is not taken into account by the market mechanism (pecuniary
externalities).
The theory of network externalities is especially helpful in our context. It has
been developed for technical networks, like telephones and software.26 Here,
individual benefits increase with the number of users through expanding markets,
reduced incompatibilities, and economies of scale. All actors have an interest of
using the technical standard; there is no incentive to defect. In addition to
technical externalities, there are also regulatory externalities, coming about
through standards set by international standard-setting bodies or by treaty law. In
the phase of standard setting, that is, lawmaking, we are typically faced with a
pure coordination game or a battle-of-the-sexes game, in the case where actors
disagree on which standards should be chosen but still prefer a common standard.
In those cases, compliance is secured once the standard is set. In a PD game, with
traditional externalities, each actor might prefer to set his own standard. Yet, they
also have an interest in setting a standard that is mutually beneficial for all. Once
the standard or norm is set – that is, once we are in the compliance stage of the
game – there may be an interest in complying with the standard if noncompliance
is sanctioned severely enough. This depends on how the compliance system is set
up. If, e.g., the system creates network externalities through introducing market
sanctions for noncompliant members,27 then states or market participants have an
interest in complying with the standard. If the sanction for noncompliance is the
exclusion of the noncompliant member from the club or network, this can be very
costly and induce compliance even in a PD game, but only if the exclusion costs
are higher than the costs of defecting. If cheating is not detectable, there is still an
incentive to defect. Thus, creating regulatory network externalities as an
enforcement mechanism works under the assumption of low transaction costs, a
sufficient amount of information, and the absence of collective action problems.
As noted above, the reciprocity compliance mechanisms work between states if
the benefits derived from cooperation are excludable. Reciprocity can also play a
role on the private market actors’ level, if the market players can be excluded.
This suggests that if the PIL regulation uses markets, then – even if public-good
creation is the ultimate goal, as with preventing terrorism financing or mitigating
civil wars through restricting trade in conflict diamonds – the chances that states
and private actors will comply with the standards are augmented. A prerequisite
for changing payoffs de facto (not only as black-letter law) and inducing
compliance is therefore the possibility of excluding market players from a market
(or considerably augmenting the costs of transactions with nonmembers).
Thereby, a club good is created (see BUCHANAN [1965]). That will happen only if
most of the market players are in the system and exclusion implies a bar to
transacting or trading; that is usual for market players, and may be true, depending
26

Seminally, KATZ AND SHAPIRO [1985], [1994], LIEBOWITZ AND MARGOLIS [1994],
BESEN AND FARRELL [1994].
27
But see generally, on the trade-off between tough compliance schemes and securing
membership in PIL, HELFER [2008]. This applies to states, but not necessarily to markets,
as the incentive to play within the market is very strong, if not a prerequisite to play at all.
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on the issue area, for states. It works only if the relevant markets are open to
cross-border transactions.
Furthermore, a system for detecting noncompliance is necessary. Thus, some
systems of monitoring, be it through NGOs or through peer-review mechanisms
providing for transparency, are a prerequisite. Monitoring requires collective
action by the participants to create the public good of adherence to the law. Here,
of course, the exclusion may be costly to the excluders, and again a second-order
enforcement problem may arise. There are three reasons why it may work
nevertheless. First, the individual monitoring and reporting costs of the
participants may be low if the information on defectors is generated in the market
transaction itself. Second, we know from public-good experiments that actors
under certain circumstances punish defectors even if it is costly to themselves
(OSTROM [2000]). Third, the system may be set up in such a way that
nonmonitoring or nonreporting itself is punished by exclusion from the club.
It should be noted that this approach is compatible with the managerial
approach of Chayes and Handler Chayes, who view the primary causes of
noncompliance as the limits of states’ capacity to comply and the legal ambiguity
of PIL (CHAYES AND HANDLER CHAYES [1993]). The limits of state capacity can
be mitigated if there are private actors actively involved in the effectuation of PIL.
Oftentimes, states do not have the monitoring facilities to assure compliance with
PIL. If private market actors have an active interest in reporting in order to punish
free-riders, the state’s capacity may be improved.
3

Different Constellations of the Market as Enforcement Mechanism

In order to illustrate the role of market mechanisms and private market players in
the enforcement of PIL, I draw on several examples, exemplifying different
constellations. I start with an international regime in the economic sphere that is
based on treaty law and has an adjudicatory mechanism (the WTO), so that
litigation is an effectuating factor but there is no direct venue for private market
actors. I then turn to an international soft law regime, also in the economic sphere
(the Financial Action Task Force). After that, a mixed regime will be analyzed,
one where states, industry, and NGOs are all participating (the Kimberley
Process).
3.1 International Regimes with a Central Enforcement Mechanism: The Trade
Regime
The international trade regime, the WTO, might seem not to be a candidate for
analysis here, as the WTO is seen as a rather effective state-to-state international
treaty.28 Nevertheless, in the WTO system, the role of private actors in bringing
complaints works indirectly through a bottom-up approach, and the incentive to
comply with a decision of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) works again
through market forces (hindering market access through retaliation). The other
28

The implementation rate of WTO decisions is estimated to be 83% (BRONCKERS
[2008, p. 121]).
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possible candidate for analysis, investment law, works through a direct possibility
of complaint by private actors (thus the second-order enforcement problem is
mitigated), and again the incentive to comply with an international arbitral
decision is partly set by the market (the competition for capital). Investment law
has been extensively dealt with and will not be discussed here.29 Rather, I will
briefly describe a system less in the forefront of the debate in the context of
compliance: that of the WTO law. WTO law has many ways to be effectuated
apart from the formal complaint procedures at the DSB. It may have direct effect
in some countries, allowing private parties to challenge WTO-inconsistent
measures before national courts. Furthermore, national courts would – even if
there is no direct effect – interpret national law in the light of the international
trade obligations.30 Legislators routinely take trade obligations into account.
Those means describe the effectuation of PIL in the national legal orders.
On the international plane, WTO law allows only for state-to-state complaints.
Nevertheless, it is well known that the bulk of WTO disputes are triggered by
private industries complaining about foreign measures. Most countries rely on
informal complaint mechanisms for their industries;31 in Switzerland, e.g., the
joke goes that one just picks up the phone to call the minister. In such countries,
the government is free to take a case to the WTO or not; it has full discretion over
its decision. Other countries have, however, introduced formal complaint
procedures for their industries to have their governments bring a case to the WTO,
namely, the United States, the European Union, and China.32 Those procedures
are meant not only to encourage private market players; they are also a venue for
gathering information on noncompliance of other states – a task a government
would not be up to.33 Those procedures give a private course of complaint to
affected industries or companies, pursuant to which the government’s handling of
private petitions about allegedly illegal foreign measures is subject to certain
procedural guarantees. Usually, the government has a duty to investigate the case,
it can require information from the complainants, and it consults and negotiates
with the government of the violating state. In many cases, a solution is found
bilaterally. The criteria on which a government can decline to take up a case are
defined in the law, and, if the government does not take up the case, it may be
subject to judicial review, as it is under the EC Trade Barriers Regulation.34
Nevertheless, the regulations always leave open a discretionary window allowing
29

See, for a convincing rationale of why investment law gives a direct course of action
to private parties and WTO law does not, SYKES [2005].
30
For an overview of the role of WTO law in national legal order, see LESTER AND
MERCURIO [2008, pp. 123–149], BRONCKERS [2008, p. 132].
31
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32
See, more generally (including the U.S.), BRONCKERS [2008], SHAFFER [2003]; for
the EC Trade Barriers Regulation (EC Council Regulation 3286/94, OJ 1994, L349/71)
and its history, see BRONCKERS AND MCNELIS [2001]; for the EU and China, see SONG
[2007]. India has a venue for complaints, but does not formalize any procdures.
33
For this line of thought, see MCCUBBINS AND SCHWARTZ [1984].
34
Case T-317/02, FICF et al. v. Commission of the European Communities, O.J. C 45,
February 19, 2005, p. 22.
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for the consideration whether an investigation is in the interest of the particular
state.35 If the states in question are members of the WTO, the governments cannot
take retaliatory sanctions unilaterally; rather, they have to use the WTO dispute
settlement machinery.36
Although those procedures vary in their details, they all have one thing in
common: they restrict the discretion of governments to bring a case to the WTO
and give private market actors a formal way of expressing their grievances. From
a public-choice point of view, interests of exporters in a country are strengthened
in comparison with those of more protectionist importers. By this, the national
players in the two-level game of enforcement are given more importance, and the
enforcement system of WTO is strengthened.
The U.S. and the EU are the members that use the dispute system of the WTO
most frequently. Since 1 January 1995, 369 disputes have been referred to the
DSU.37 The EU had 78 cases as a complainant; the U.S., 89 cases. These numbers
far exceed those of any other country,38 and may not be due to their trading power
only (although an empirical study is still missing).
3.2 International Soft Law Regimes without Litigation: The FATF
A further interesting regime in which market mechanisms play an important role
without litigation being available for its functioning is the Financial Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF). It is an intergovernmental body with the purpose of
the developing and promoting national and international policies to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing, which are viewed as destabilizing the
international financial system. The FATF was created by a G-7 summit in Paris in
1989 and has 34 member countries. The FATF published 40 recommendations in
the area of money laundering (ML) in 1990 (revised in 1996 and 2003) and added
9 recommendations after 9/11 on the topic of terrorism financing (TF). The aim of
the FATF is, although its membership is not universal, to universalize the
standards. The recommendations are to some extent identical with those of the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), the UN Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), and
the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), as
well as Security Council measures that needed to be undertaken under the various
antiterrorism resolutions after 9/11.39 Although they are nonbinding on the states
(that is, they are international soft law), their implementation can be viewed as
35
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very effective. The 40 recommendations on ML contain primarily measures states
have to take internally to ensure effective combat against ML,40 such as
criminalizing ML and TF (Recommendation 1), legislative measures to enable
their competent authorities to confiscate property laundered and proceeds from
money laundering or predicate offences (Recommendation 3), and prescribing
measures for financial institutions and other businesses41 to implement customer
due diligence (CDD) and record-keeping to know their customers (KYC)
(Recommendations 4, 5, 10), with an enhanced system for “politically exposed
persons” (PEPs) (Recommendation 6). In interbank and cross-border transactions,
the financial institution has to make sure that the corresponding institution adheres
to the recommendations (Recommendation 7). This amounts to a market peerreview mechanism. The firms also have to report suspicious transactions and
compliance (Recommendation 13 et seq.) to a national financial intelligence unit
(Recommendation 26 et seq.). Most of the recommendations ultimately address
private actors in the financial market industry.
Of interest for our topic are especially the monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.42 They consist in a self-assessment exercise and a mutual peerreview evaluation. In the self-assessment exercise, every member country
provides information on the status of its implementation of the recommendations
by responding each year to a standard questionnaire. The second element for
monitoring the implementation is the mutual evaluation process, which is by now
in its third round. Each member country is examined in turn by the FATF on the
basis of an on-site visit conducted by a team of selected experts in the legal,
financial, and law-enforcement fields from other member governments. The
purpose of the visit is to draw up a report assessing the extent to which the
evaluated country has moved forward in implementing an effective system to
counter ML and to highlight areas in which further progress may still be required.
The mutual evaluation process is enhanced by the FATF’s policy for dealing with
members not in compliance with the recommendations. The measures contained
in this policy represent a graduated approach aimed at reinforcing peer pressure
on member governments to take action to tighten their anti-money-laundering
systems. The policy starts by requiring the country to deliver progress reports at
plenary meetings. Further steps include a letter from by the FATF president or
sending a high-level mission to the noncomplying member country. The FATF
can also apply Recommendation 21, which results in issuing a statement calling
on financial institutions to give special attention to business relations and
transactions with persons, companies, and financial institutions domiciled in the
noncomplying country. Then, as a final measure, the FATF membership of the
country in question can be suspended.

40

For the text, see http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/
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Since the FATF aims at universal compliance with its standards, also
nonmembers of the FATF are monitored, and since 1998 it has been possible to
blacklist a nonmember as a so-called noncooperative country or territory
(NCCT).43 The goal of this initiative has been to secure the adoption by all
financial centers of international standards to prevent, detect, and punish ML and
TF, and thereby effectively cooperate internationally in the global fight against
ML and TF. Forty-seven jurisdictions were referred to the NCCTs process and
were reviewed in two rounds (31 in 200144, and 16 in 200245). A total of 23
jurisdictions were identified as NCCTs (15 in 2000, and 8 in 2001). The FATF
recommended that financial institutions give special attention to transactions
involving the NCCTs, in accordance with Recommendation 21. That basically
implies that enhanced scrutiny is necessary when conducting business with
companies or financial institutions from a NCCT, thereby augmenting
transactions costs considerably for both parties. In addition to the application of
Recommendation 21, in cases where NCCTs had failed to make adequate
progress, the FATF recommended the application of further countermeasures
taken in concert. These included the possibility of stringent requirements for
identifying clients and enhancing advisories (including jurisdiction-specific
financial advisories) to financial institutions for identification of the beneficial
owners before business relationships are established with individuals or
companies from these countries; enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or
systematic reporting of financial transactions on the basis that financial
transactions with such countries are more likely to be suspicious; taking into
account the fact that the relevant bank is from a NCCT when considering requests
for approving the establishment in FATF member countries of subsidiaries or
branches or representative offices of banks; and warning non-financial-sector
businesses that conducting transactions with entities within the NCCTs might run
the risk of money laundering (FATF [2007, p. 4]). As a means of last resort, it was
foreseen that all financial transactions with NCCTs might be prohibited. In 2006,
Myanmar, the last country on the blacklist, was delisted from it. Since then, no
country has been blacklisted. Assuming that the influence of the FATF has not
diminished, this can be called a success, though it has been heavily criticized for
contravening international law by effectively threatening an economic embargo on
NCCTs (see DOYLE [2002, p. 281]).
How can a soft law regime be so effective? First of all, the member countries
of the FATF cover all the largest financial centers of the world and thus cover the
major part of global financial transactions. One state alone (e.g., the United
States) could not have achieved that, since other financial market centers could
have profited from stricter regulation in the United States. A pure export of
regulation would thus have been difficult. By involving all the big financial
43
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centers, this problem was mitigated. But the weakest-link problem could still
appear, and thus the FATF sought to universalize the standards. They could do so
because the club they formed was big enough to shut other states out of the global
financial market. Secondly, the regime instituted a peer-review system with onsite inspections. Although there is no information on the internal processes of the
countries that were blacklisted, it can be assumed that considerable internal
pressure was exerted on governments by their financial (and nonfinancial)
businesses, as their costs of doing business with the rest of the world (and the
largest financial markets) were effectively augmented considerably. By targeting
the financial market industry as the ultimate addressee of the measures, the FATF
can use the regulatory network externalities as incentives to make states comply
with the system. By effectively sanctioning the financial market sector in
noncomplying states, the two-level game shifts the payoffs, leading to
compliance. Also, nonmonitoring and nonreporting in this case lead to
punishment by the other states and their banks. The collective-action problem in
enforcement is thereby mitigated.
3.3 Mixed Regimes without Litigation: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
Let us now turn to a phenomenon that has been widely noticed in the humanrights sphere: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Although it
is still subject to criticism for ineffectiveness,46 it is nevertheless praised for its
success for curbing the trade in conflict diamonds.47 It is one of the first regimes
where states, industry, and NGOs not only have set the rules but also do the
monitoring and enforcement of the regime. The Kimberley Process is not a treaty;
it is nonbinding on its state parties and is not legally enforceable by an
international tribunal. Yet, the measures taken by the parties to the agreement,
including the diamond industry, show that it was intended to obligate its
participants, that it is enforceable, and that, by the effects of its operation, it is de
facto binding on all of its members (see CURTIS [2007], FELDMAN [2003]).
The system was developed at the beginning of this century when it became
ever clearer – especially through NGO campaigning – that diamond exploration
and trading is fueling civil wars and grave human-rights abuses in Africa, and
contributing to some extent to the profits of the diamond industry (see TAMM
[2004]). Although the United Nations had issued trade embargoes under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, requiring all states to comply with their provisions (Art.
103), for several African countries (Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia), although the
General Assembly had issued recommendations,48 the flow of conflict diamonds
was not substantially curbed – they are difficult to trace to their origin, and they
46
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are the most densely concentrated wealth of the world, which makes them easy
and attractive to smuggle: they are highly valuable, small in size, easy to hide, and
not detected by metal detectors. As international reactions by NGOs – and by
consumers – became stronger, a first international meeting of Southern African
diamond-producing states designed to combat the conflict-diamond trade was
convened in the South African diamond town of Kimberley in May 2000. Later
that year, in December, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting
the creation of an international certification scheme for rough diamonds.49 By
November 2002, negotiations between governments, the international diamond
industry, and civil-society organizations in Interlaken, Switzerland, resulted in the
creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The Kimberley
scheme was formally adopted on 5 November 2002 in the Interlaken Declaration50
and became effective on 1 January 2003, when participating countries started to
implement its rules.
The KPCS document51 sets out the requirements for controlling rough-diamond
production and trade. The Kimberley Process sets up an international scheme of
certification requirement for rough-diamond exports to, and imports from,
participants. Certification requires certain minimum standards and aims to
eliminate conflict diamonds52 from all shipments to and from participants.
Countries that do not participate in the KPCS are effectively shut out of the
market, as its participants account for approximately 99.8% of the global
production of rough diamonds.53 Participants have to ensure that no shipment of
rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a nonparticipant (§ III (c) KPCS).
Trade between Kimberley participants is restricted to certified nonconflict
diamonds, and trade between Kimberley participants and nonparticipants is
prohibited altogether (see PAUWELYN [2003, p. 1179]).
Participants – by now 48, representing 74 countries (with the European
Community and its Member States counting as an individual participant) – have to
implement national regulations with respect to the certification scheme, together
with internal systems of controls. They have to meet the requirements of forgeryproof and tamperproof certificates and shipping containers for the transport of
rough diamonds. Furthermore, they have to provide quantitative statistics on
imports, exports, and mining activities. These minimum standards only apply to
rough diamonds and import and export controls. States also have to maintain
dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions. Beyond that, no additional
requirements need be met. This flexible approach was also meant to make
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participation in the scheme as attractive as possible – widespread participation
being a prerequisite of the effective self-enforcement of the system.54
Although only states are participants in the scheme, the official observers –
namely, the NGOs Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, as well as the
World Diamond Council (WDC) as the industry representative (representing
jewelers, traders, and manufacturers) – play important roles. The KPCS has three
specialized working groups, on monitoring (WGM), statistics, and diamond
expertise, respectively. The observers are actively involved in the monitoring
group, due to their administrative tasks, and they also partially finance the
activities of the WGM (PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA [2006, p. 8]). The peer
review system consists essentially of the following components: annual reporting
by each participating state, which is not publicized; review visits; and review
missions. It is governed by the provisions of an administrative decision.55
Furthermore, there is a checklist for review visits from 2007, which recommends
that review teams, consisting of participant countries as well as the official
observers, should typically examine physical evidence of KPCS compliance
through visits to the designated KP Authority, Departments of Minerals and/or
Mines, and customs, law enforcement, and related agencies; and through
examination of KPCS processes. Teams may also meet with companies and other
entities in the diamond sector and with representatives of local civil society, and
may visit mines in producer countries. They issue recommendations.
In case a country does not comply with the KPCS, it may be expelled from the
scheme. The only country so far to be expelled was the Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville), which had been admitted to the scheme in 2003. It has no active
diamond mining industry or diamond imports, but was suddenly exporting huge
numbers of diamonds. The decision to remove the ROC was based on the findings
of a review mission sent by the Kimberley Process to the ROC in May 2004 to
assess its compliance with the certification scheme. Led by the South African
government, the mission found that the ROC’s controls were inadequate, poorly
enforced, and therefore unable to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the
legitimate diamond trade.56 The ROC was readmitted to the Kimberley Process
after scrutiny in 2007. Ghana was on the verge of being expelled due to
unaccounted smuggling from Côte d’Ivoire (where the government had placed an
export ban on diamonds); it is now working to improve controls.57
Through a game-theoretic lens, the underlying problem structure for dealing
with conflict diamonds is a PD game. Every market participant has an interest in
defecting by being able to sell conflict diamonds (if it is an exporting state that
trades or mines conflict diamonds) or to buy diamonds at a lower price (if it is a
diamond industry). But the Kimberley Process creates a situation where in order
for any state or diamond industry to participate in the international diamond trade,
54
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it must adhere to the Kimberley Process. The market is restructured as a club good
through the KPCS, thereby making use of the network-externalities rationale. As
almost 100% of the diamond trade is conducted between Kimberley members, and
those members, including all the big importing states, admit only certified
diamonds, being shut out of the market essentially means that no nonmember can
engage in trade. Neither the states nor the industries have an interest in that. This
constellation leads to an effective self-enforcing equilibrium. Furthermore, the
role of NGOs is considerable. Not only were they the ones that brought the
problem to public notice, thus endangering the end market for the high-profityielding jewel diamonds (as opposed to industrial diamonds), but they are also
very active in monitoring. By influencing the “world court of public opinion” and
by targeting the audience of consumers with deep pockets, they created sharp
incentives for the industry to participate in the first place.58
The WDC has added teeth to the KPCS by closing the loophole for polished
diamonds. It could do so because the diamond industry is a closely knit network,
which is very much based on the idea of club goods.59 Developed by the
International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA) and the World
Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB) under the auspices of the WDC, a
system of warranties for diamonds has been created that has been endorsed by all
KPCS participants. Under this system, all buyers and sellers of both rough and
polished diamonds must make an affirmative statement on all invoices that the
diamonds are purchased from legitimate sources. The following principles of selfregulation were endorsed: to trade only with companies that include warranty
declarations on their invoices; not to buy diamonds from suspect sources or
unknown suppliers, or that originate in countries that have not implemented the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme; not to buy diamonds from any sources
that, after a legally binding due-process system, have been found to have violated
government regulations restricting the trade in conflict diamonds; not to buy
diamonds in or from any region that is subject to an advisory statement by a
governmental authority indicating that conflict diamonds are emanating from or
available for sale in that region, unless the diamonds have been exported from that
region in compliance with the KPCS; not knowingly to buy or sell or assist others
to buy or sell conflict diamonds; and to ensure that all company employees that
buy or sell diamonds within the diamond trade are well informed regarding trade
resolutions and government regulations restricting the trade in conflict
diamonds.60 The principles are to be monitored by the firms’ auditors. Failure to
abide by these principles exposes the member to expulsion from industry
organizations.
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Nevertheless, NGOs keep criticizing the self-regulatory system for not being
effective.61 But it has the advantage that the market actors involved have an active
interest in monitoring the gems, for they might be unsure whether the next market
actor in line might report on them and thereby get them punished. The system
thereby creates incentives for punishing defectors, since nonpunishers are
punished themselves. Therefore, the market mechanism works directly in this case
– either through the price mechanism or through reputational sanctions among the
market players (see BERNSTEIN [1992]).
It should be noticed that the system works in conjunction with the UN and the
international trading system, the former relying now on the KPCS in that
sanctions against a civil-war country are only ended if the country becomes a
member of the KPCS.62 The WTO issued a waiver in 2003 in order to create legal
security for the participating members that the KPCS was WTO-conforming.63
Though the Kimberley Process started with UN sanctions, by now the KPCS
serves as their replacement and also validates legitimate conflict-free diamond
trade (see CURTIS [2007, p. 27]). It should also be noted that the system works
more effectively than the UN Security Council resolutions did (see FELDMAN
[2003, p. 845]).
4

Conclusion and Outlook

The attempt in this paper has been to draw attention to private actors and market
mechanisms in the enforcement of PIL. For methodological reasons, most
scholars in international law and economics confine their analysis to states only.
This carries the danger that important mechanisms for making PIL effective will
be overlooked. Whereas the two-level game of lawmaking procedures is well
acknowledged in the scholarship, the two-level game in the second stage, the
compliance decision, has not been extensively analyzed. Although, in my view,
private actors and market mechanisms do not have the same importance in
effectuating PIL in all issue areas, in those areas where private market actors’
interests are affected by PIL, whether as private persons or as businesses, their
role should be taken into account when reviewing mechanisms for effectuating
PIL.
Giving private actors a direct course of action against states is one step in
generating compliance. It helps to foster compliance by strengthening the
reputational sanction mechanism as international court or tribunal (or committee)
61
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decisions generate information. This also holds for nonmarket actors in humanrights law, although the compliance problem may persists in the implementation
phase. Nevertheless, litigation is one contribution to using the reputational
mechanism in PIL. In international investment law, a tribunal’s decision is usually
complied with, as noncompliance leads to direct sanctioning by market forces in
the postlitigation phase. If bilateral investment treaties are one of the means for
attracting capital,64 noncompliance with a decision will send a strong signal to
potential investors that the country is not protecting and not willing to protect
investors’ property rights. Thus, private actors play an important role not only in
bringing the case in the first place, but also in changing the payoffs in the second
stage: the implementation of a ruling.
In issue areas where private actors have no rights and no jus standi but an
interest in the litigation, as in the WTO, providing a formal venue for complaints
on the national plane might ease the second-order enforcement problem, at least in
the first stage (the bringing of a complaint). Thereby, directly affected interests
have an influence on the enforcement of PIL.
In constellations without international adjudicatory mechanisms, dealing with
issue areas of PIL that ultimately target private market actors, market mechanisms
can be used for greater effectiveness. If there is an enforcement system that allows
for making use of the incentive structure of network externalities (that is, if it is
possible to exclude noncompliant members from the club), then it is in the selfinterest of states to comply with the standards set. That holds even more if the
ultimate addressees of the PIL norm (soft or hard) are private actors. Again, we
find two possibilities. There may either be a strong lobbying force of private
market actors inducing the governments to comply with the standards since
otherwise the private actors would not be able to participate in the market (or
could do so only with high transaction costs). Or private actors may have a direct
role in monitoring compliance of states. Again, those can be NGOs or members of
the industries directly concerned. One prerequisite for this kind of system is, first,
that it must be possible to create network externalities through international
regulation. This is the case if the markets are global and nonparticipation in the
market essentially shuts down businesses (as is the case in financial markets or the
diamond market). Second, noncompliance needs to be well monitored, because a
PD game is played by private actors (and states): Defection, if not detected, would
be the preferred option. In order to change payoffs, the costs for noncompliance
need to be set high. By (temporary) exclusion, states (and private actors) are
retaliating against the violating state.
The lesson learned from the Kimberley Process is that in order to effectuate
international sanctions, the system cannot stop short in the black-box state and
only impose obligations on states – as it did when only UN sanctions were issued.
Rather, it needs to permeate the network of all actors involved, that is, the market
forces. In order to create an incentive-compatible system for the market
participants, potential (reputational) sanctions in the form of losing market shares
through consumer boycotts are necessary. Two prerequisites are needed: first, the
sanctions need to target an end-consumer market. Second, there needs to be
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transparency and publicity, which can be created by NGOs as independent
monitors. If the market targets end consumers, information through monitoring
(and thus reputation) can be enhanced by the potential loss of markets if there are
moral issues involved. This holds true not only for conflict diamonds but also for
the whole discussion on corporate social responsibility. Involvement of industry
and NGOs can generate information and thus augment reputation costs
considerably.
Those mechanisms are not confined to PIL only. Rather, they can also come
into play when states export their regulation. Unilateral sanctions against states
that involve private industry, such as prohibiting banks of one’s own jurisdiction
from doing business with banks that continue to do business with the sanctioned
state, can be very effective. Equally, setting certain protective standards, e.g., in
food or chemicals regulation, can lead to a de facto export of regulations if the
standard-setting jurisdiction has a market that is sufficiently important. To my
knowledge, those mechanisms have not yet been analyzed with rational-choice
tools, but research in this area seems promising.
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